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The Common Fisheries Policy: An exercise in marine exploitation 
Introduction 
The seas and oceans cover 71 per cent of the surface of the earth but, beyond the horizon, 
are largely unobserved. Marine areas provide 17 per cent of the global population’s protein 
intake, and over 3 billion people with 20 percent of their protein. Following population 
growth, the oceans are expected to make significant contribution to food security for over 9 
billion people by 2050.1 Aside from nutrition, the seas deliver many other ecosystem 
benefits, including climate stabilisation, molecules used in medicine and engineering, the 
protection of coastlines through ecosystems, such as corals and mangrove, and act as a sink 
for 90 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, its vital importance is often 
overlooked. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change notes only ‘the importance of ensuring 
the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity’, making 
no further reference to marine areas.2 On land, trees and plants provide half the earth’s 
primary production, the other half coming from marine ecosystems through ‘minute, short-
lived microorganisms suspended in the sunlit surface layer of the oceans’.3  This production 
sustains the life of all other organisms in the marine environment, including fish, hence the 
importance of protecting the integrity of marine ecosystems. It is troubling then that the 
whole North East Atlantic area is categorised as in overall decline following historic peaks in 
catching in the middle of the last century.4 
Under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, ecosystem protection through ecosystem-based 
management is secondary to the primary objective of sustainable exploitation of the 
resource, which applies the internationally recognised precautionary approach. So far the 
commercial exploitation of fisheries, an industry privileged and protected under the EU 
Treaties, has operated to prevent ecosystem protection and has operated in contravention 
of the EU’s commitment to sustainable development. The Commission has characterised the 
overexploitation of the EU fish resource as a ‘tragedy of the commons’ but the problem is 
better understood as a market failure in which those licensed to access the public resource 
for commercial exploitation do not pay for the stocks extracted and are not required to 
ensure their regeneration. While regulation has sought to contain fishing activity within 
sustainable bounds, successive reforms have not managed the restoration of stocks to the 
abundance of the early 20th century or even the years prior to the adoption of the Common 
Fisheries Policy.  
The TFEU obliges the integration of environmental protection into the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities. In 2013, the EU adopted the seventh of 
                                                          
1 FAO State of World Fisheries 2016, 2-4 
2 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016), recital 13, 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf 
3 P. Mladenov, Marine Biology: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013), 19 
4 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016: Contributing to food security and nutrition for all, 
(Rome, 2016), 39 and 42; J. Hutchings and J. Reynolds, ‘Marine Fish Population Collapses: Consequences for 
Recovery and Extinction Risk’, BioScience 54(2004), 297-309 
its Environmental Action Plans, entitled ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’.5 
Ecosystems in EU marine waters are described as under severe pressure from the intense 
exploitation of economic opportunities across diverse sectors, from the traditional activities 
of fishing and shipping to newer and emerging industries including aquaculture, offshore 
energy, marine biotechnology and deep-sea mining. Despite a substantial body of EU 
legislation dealing with issues ranging across water resources, waste water, pollutants, air 
quality, as well as the environmental legislation for the protection of nature, birds, habitats 
and marine areas, the Union’s natural capital in its biodiversity, including marine 
ecosystems, continues to be lost and degraded. Seeking to rebalance trade and commercial 
policies within the bounds of the ability of the natural environment to endure, the 
Environmental Action Plan (EAP) counsels Member States that ‘care needs to be taken’ to 
ensure the exploitation of resources ‘is compatible with the conservation and sustainable 
management of marine and coastal ecosystems’.6 Priority objectives are set out to include 
the protection, conservation and enhancement of the Union’s natural capital as well the 
improvement of environmental integration and policy coherence.7 The EAP notes that 
progress towards ‘good environmental status’ for EU marine areas by 2020 is being 
impeded, and at the top of the list of reasons for this is persistent overfishing.8 This article 
considers how the Common Fisheries Policy obstructs the broader objectives of EU 
environmental protection and sustainability that the citizens of Europe deserve.  
 
The Common Fisheries Policy  
Under the terms of the TEU, the limits of Union competence are governed by the principle 
of conferral.9 The Union has exclusive competence over ‘the conservation of marine 
biological resources under the common fisheries policy’ but shares competence with the 
Member States over all other aspects of fisheries policy as well as over environmental 
protection.10 Fisheries share a title in the TFEU alongside agriculture, and find their rationale 
in provisions retained from the founding Treaty of Rome. The primary objective of current 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) are to increase productivity through technical progress and 
the optimum utilisation of labour, while ensuring a fair standard of living for those engaged 
in the sector, stabilising markets and securing the availability of supplies at reasonable 
prices for consumers.11 In the post-war era, ensuring food security was of immediate 
concern to Europe which explains the priority given to productivity and consumer 
protection in the founding Treaty. At that stage, other than knowledge of the vulnerability 
of fish stocks to overexploitation, the marine environment was insufficiently well 
                                                          
5 Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a 
General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’ Text with 
EEA relevance, OJ 2013 L354/171 
6 7th Environmental Action Plan, Recital 21 
7 7th Environmental Action Plan, Article 2(1)(a) and (g) 
8 7th Environmental Action Plan, Recitals 17-19 
9 Article 5 TEU 
10 Articles 3 and 4 TFEU 
11 Now, Title III, Agriculture and Fisheries, Articles 38-44 TFEU 
understood to give marine environmental and ecosystem protection adequate attention. 
Meanwhile, the sustainability of fish stocks was assumed so that regulation aimed at 
maximising extraction, making overexploitation and biological collapse an inherent risk 
within regulation.  
Since the early days of the EU, knowledge and information has improved and the risk to the 
sustainability of the living natural resource in EU waters is recognised. However, there has 
been no amendment of the Treaty in the light of this better understanding or harmonisation 
of fishing regulation to coalesce with environmental protection required of agriculture or 
other commercial sectors. The result has been an unrelenting decline in stocks and 
ecosystems. In 2011 the Court of Auditors concluded the EU fleet was too big for the 
available resource which leads to overexploitation through illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing.12 Whilst this is so, there is no recognition that the CFP itself causes 
overfishing by setting exploitation rates at levels higher than recommended by scientific 
advice. Instead, a system of Byzantium complexity has evolved and, as noted by the Court of 
Auditors, the multiplicity of legislation makes the monitoring and control of fishing activity 
difficult.  
The foundations of the CFP were laid down in 1970 but the policy was not fully formulated 
until 1983.13 The scope of the CFP is limited within the 12nm territorial zone but has 
exclusive application in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Member States and in 
those areas of the high seas where the EU has negotiated international agreement. 
Collectively, for the purpose of fisheries, the Member State EEZs are treated as EU waters. 
These waters operate as a common property or pool resource with a fish quota allocation 
by the EU to each Member State, which is distributed by them to fishing operators through 
a restricted access regime, usually by licencing. Although the exploitation of the resource is 
subject to detailed regulation, the benefit stream from the fish resource accrues to the 
fishing interests holding the quota share, in effect vesting them with property rights. These 
shares confer rights of access and appropriation subject to obligations to observe use rules, 
rights to participate in decision-making and rights of alienation. 
In its 2011 reform proposals for the CFP, the Commission envisaged environmental 
sustainability as being the immediate objective of the policy, even describing the 
conservation of marine biological resources as the fundamental pillar to achieve the 
objectives of the CFP.14 Following delays caused in part by disagreement over the 
substantive content of the new policy and in part by disagreement between the European 
Parliament and Council over competence and legal base in decision-making, in 2014, a new 
                                                          
12 European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 12/2011, ‘Have EU measures contributed to adapting the 
capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing opportunities?’, (Luxembourg, 2011), pursuant to Article 
287(4)(2) TFEU (Special Report No 12/2011). This was previously examined in Special report No 3/93 
concerning the implementation of the measures for the restructuring, modernization and adaptation of the 
capacities of fishing fleets in the Community together with the Commission's replies, [1993] OJ C2  
13 13 Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 of the Council laying down a common structural policy for the fishing 
industry, [1970] OJ Spec Ed 703, repealed and replaced; Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 establishing a 
Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources, [1983] OJ L24/1, repealed 
14 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2011) 425 final, (Proposed Fisheries Regulation), Explanatory Memorandum, 7 
governing Regulation came into force, generally known as the Basic or Fisheries Regulation. 
This intends securing the restoration of fish stocks to sustainability and their maintenance in 
at a level that will ensure availability into the future.15 The objectives of the reformed CFP 
are stipulated as being to ‘ensure fishing and aquaculture are environmentally sustainable in 
the long-term and are managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of achieving 
economic, social and employment benefits, and of contributing to the availability of food 
supplies’.16 Operation of the policy is to be according to particular principles governing 
fishing activity which are not found elsewhere in EU law.  
 
Sustainable Exploitation 
The first and most basic principle of fisheries policy is the principle of sustainable 
exploitation. This is not defined in the Fisheries Regulation but is included in the Part III 
Title: ‘Measures for the conservation and sustainable exploitation of marine biological 
resources’. Despite the title, this part of the regulation provides no elaboration of 
sustainable exploitation and all provisions are presented as being for the purpose of 
conservation. In a discussion of fisheries management, it has been suggested that 
conservation is directed at the sustained use of fisheries resources and that conservation 
measures are those that place restrictions on extraction.17 Sustained use may be 
understood as ‘doing things that can be continued over long periods without unacceptable 
consequences, or without unacceptable risks of unacceptable consequences’.18 
Sustainability has ‘at least four separate but related objectives’.19 These are: intergeneration 
equity in the use of natural resources; a standard for the exploitation of natural resources; 
equitable use taking account of other states and peoples; the integration of environmental 
considerations in economic plans while environmental needs are considered in applying 
environmental objectives.20 Under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention fishing activity is to 
be constrained so that it does not exceed maximum sustainable yield, a standard for 
exploitation that has been adopted in EU fisheries regulation.21  
Maximum sustainable yield is defined as meaning ‘the highest theoretical equilibrium yield 
that can be continuously taken on average from a stock under existing average 
                                                          
15 Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries 
Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council 
Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC, [2013] OJ L354/22 
(2013 Fisheries Regulation), in force 1st January 2014  
16 Regulation 1380/2013, Article 2(1) 
17 T. Markus, European Fisheries Law: From Promotion to Management, (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 
2009), 65 
18 G. Heal, ‘Markets and Sustainability’, in R. Revesz, P. Sands and R. Stewart, Environmental Law, the Economy, 
and Sustainable Development, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), 410-427, 410 
19 P. Sands, Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first Century: Sustainable Development and International 
Law’, in R. Revesz, P. Sands and R. Stewart, Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable Development, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), 369-409, 374 
20 Ibid. 
21 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 
3) (UNCLOS), Article 61(3) 
environmental conditions without significantly affecting the reproduction process’.22 
Accordingly, to achieve the objectives of the CFP, the Union is to adopt conservation 
measures such as multiannual plans to restore and maintain stocks above maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). To do this, the Fisheries Regulation is to set targets for exploitation 
that minimise the impact of fishing on the marine environment. Highly prescriptive 
measures for setting catch targets are detailed so that regulation will move from the 
traditional annual total allowable catch permissions to multiannual plans. Whether these 
apply to single or multiple species, they are to comply with the principles and objectives for 
the restoration and maintenance of fish stocks above MSY.23 Specific indicators are provided 
in ‘conservation reference points’, which incorporate the precautionary reference points 
management scheme provided in the international Fish Stocks Agreement.24 The application 
of these limits is intended to ensure objectives such as ‘an acceptable level of biological risk 
or a desired level of yield’.25 Member States are required to reduce the capacity of their 
fishing fleets, provide economic or fishing opportunity incentives to promote less damaging 
capture methods and measures that aid the landing obligation.26 As MSY has not been 
achieved, the Union may establish stock recovery areas, especially where there are heavy 
concentrations of fish below minimum conservation reference size or the area is a spawning 
ground.27  
The entire thrust of the provisions in this part of the Regulation seeks to constrain the 
extraction activity of the fisheries sector to enable the restoration of stocks so that the 
resource has the time and space to regenerate. However, with measures for the 
conservation and sustainable exploitation of the living resource directed at sustained use 
they and are not designed to ensure the protection of the ecosystem on which the targeted 
fish depend. With conservation established as constraint mechanisms on excessive 
extractive activity, exploitation provisions are dealt with rather briefly in two sections of the 
Regulation concerning the allocation of fishing entitlements. Such allocations are adopted 
by the EU in accordance with the second principle of fisheries policy, the principle of relative 
stability.28  
 
 
Relative Stability 
                                                          
22 Regulation 1380/2013, Article 4(7) 
23 Regulation 1380/2013, Articles 9-10 
24 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA) (New York, 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 3), Annex II; Agreement on the 
implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, 
OJ 1998 L189/16; Regulation 1380/2013, Articles 4(16) and (17) 
25 Regulation 1380/2013, Articles 4(16) 
26 Regulation 1380/2013, Article 7 
27 Regulation 1380/2013, Article 8(1) 
28 Regulation 1380/2013, Articles 16-17 
Relative stability is a concept peculiar to the CFP and has been given legal traction as a 
principle of law by the Court of Justice.29 Although the principle is not defined, its meaning is 
set out in the recitals of the Fisheries Regulation. The ‘precarious state of the fishing 
industry and the dependence of certain coastal communities on fishing’ make it necessary 
to divide fishing opportunities between Member States ‘based on a predictable share of the 
stocks for each Member State’.30 Giving substance to this arrangement for determining 
Member State shares in stocks, the Regulation makes reference to the original 1976 
instrument establishing the CFP which adopted the principle. This had observed that the 
‘temporary biological situation of stocks’ makes it necessary to safeguard the interests of 
communities that are particularly dependent on fishing activities, and has provided the 
rationale for allocations ever since.31 Thus, according to the reasoning of the original CFP, 
the availability of fish stocks could not be guaranteed making it appropriate to protect those 
most economically vulnerable, identified as those living in coastal communities whose 
existence was predicated on fishing activity. These communities were recognised as having 
few alternatives for employment and were to be protected through a guaranteed fish share. 
Nevertheless, with diminishing fish stocks, increasingly sophisticated technology replacing 
fishing crew, and consolidation of the fleet, the protection of traditional fishing communities 
has not proved possible. As a result, coastal communities are to be supported in diversifying 
their economies and creating jobs in sectors other than fishing.32 Now, the historic rights of 
catch entrenched in fisheries regulation as a result of the principle of relative stability accrue 
to investors in the industry, who, at the same time acquire legitimate expectations in 
allocations of catch share.   
Although the historic connection between coastal communities and the variable fish stocks 
on which they depend has been broken, the principle of relative stability has been 
manipulated to support Member State claims to fishing opportunity share. As well as 
maintaining fish share, it is relevant where new species come to be regulated. In making the 
allocation of previously unregulated stocks, the Union institutions are dependent on catch 
data submitted by the Member States. In a case decided by the Court of Justice in 2017, 
Spain had applied for annulment of a Council regulation setting out fishing opportunities for 
roundnose and roughhead grenadier fish, alleging allocations breached the principle of 
relative stability.33  Checking Member State assessments of catches of the roundnose and 
roughhead grenadier species was hampered in that the two fish are indistinguishable once 
caught and processed. However, scientific advice given to the Union suggested that Spain 
had misreported its catches of both species. Evidence was that Spain had claimed higher 
catches of roughhead and had under-reported catches of roundnose by including that catch 
                                                          
29 Joined Cases C-61/96, C-132/97, C-45/98, C-81/00 and C-22/01 Spain v Council [2002] ECR I-3439, paragraph 
38 
30 Regulation 1380/2013, Recital 35 
31 Regulation 1380/2013, Recital 36; Council resolution on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-
mile fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977, OJ (1981) C 105/1 
32 Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 
and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
[2014] OJ L149/1, Article 63 
33 Case C-128/15, Spain v Council, judgment of 11 January 2017 
in its roughhead calculation. This skewing of catch information by Spain risked a substantial 
impact on the effectiveness of the TAC established for the roundnose stock. So the reality 
was that spurious historic catch evidence was submitted to satisfy a specious principle of 
social protection. In response, the Council had adopted a joint TAC for both species but the 
issue would be revisited. Once statistical evidence on the state of stocks had been 
substantiated and prior catch levels verified, allocations would be made applying the 
principle of relative stability.34 
In considering Spain’s application, the Court of Justice confirmed its previous case law on 
the principle of relative stability, offering no critical analysis of an outmoded principle of 
allocation. The Court reiterated its usual observation that the principle operates to ensure 
each Member State an equitable share of the established TAC determined on the basis of 
catches traditionally taken by Member States prior to the establishment of the quota 
scheme, taking account of the local populations especially dependent on fisheries and 
fishery related industries.35 Turning to the claim of share made by Spain, the Court noted 
that, had the Council accepted the accuracy of Spain’s reported catches of roughhead 
grenadier evidencing historic catch and based its allocations of the TAC on this information, 
it would have created ‘a lasting advantage’ for Spain.36 Furthermore, such recognition would 
establish a legitimate expectation of future allocations of fish share in the same proportion. 
The principle of relative stability crystallises fishing entitlements in all future allocation of a 
regulated stock.  
Without a genuine coastal connection, the retention of the principle of relative stability is 
unjustifiable. According to the Fisheries Regulation, fishing activity is to be environmentally 
sustainable delivering economic, social, employment and food benefits.37 Not all outcomes 
will be possible so a balancing of these sustainability factors has to be made when 
determining fishing opportunities. The principle of relative stability is invoked as a social 
factor to support the economic imperative for the maximisation of fishing activity, meaning 
that the environmental factor of sustainability, which may be reflected in scientific advice 
recommending reduced or low extraction levels, will be overridden. Once the principle of 
relative stability has been applied to create a legitimate interest in the maintenance of 
proportionate shares in the total allowable catch, there will be enormous pressure from the 
industry to maintain catch levels; a smaller total allowable catch leads to smaller 
proportional shares to Member States and subsequently to its industry. Application of the 
principle of relative stability has not fulfilled its original objective of protecting vulnerable 
fishing communities. Its retention perpetrates a societal fiction, impeding the achievement 
of sustainable fisheries and the Court ought to reassess its interpretation.  
The Precautionary Approach 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Paragraph 57 citing, Case C-3/87 Agegate, [1989] ECR 4459, paragraph 24  
36 Paragraph 60 
37 Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries 
Policy, OJ L354/22 (2013 Fisheries Regulation), Article 2(1) 
The third principle of fishing is the precautionary approach which was adopted from the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement (FSA) and is defined in the CFP as ‘an approach according to which 
the absence of adequate scientific information should not justify postponing or failing to 
take management measures to conserve target species, associated or dependent species 
and non-target species and their environment’.38 Under the Fisheries Regulation, the 
principle is stated to be derived from the precautionary principle as set out in the Treaty, 
which stipulates that environmental protection must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of other Community policies.39 The precautionary principle has been 
recognised as a general principle of EU law and has been given explication by the 
Commission, so that it is to be applied ‘specifically where preliminary objective scientific 
evaluation, indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent 
with the high level of protection chosen for the Community’.40  
The Court of Justice has defined the scope of the precautionary principle to encompass all 
matters concerned with human health and consumer safety across all EU activity.41  
Precaution operates with regard to human health because, in the event of the risk 
occurring, there is a ‘likelihood of real harm to public health...the precautionary principle 
justifies the adoption of restrictive measures, provided they are non-discriminatory and 
objective.’42 However, the principle does not extend to the protection of the environment 
except where this has implications for public health.43 As the risk to human health is the 
perquisite for the application of the precautionary principle, it has not been extended to 
fisheries policy. Where the precautionary principle has been sought to be relied upon with 
regard to the CFP, the Court has been careful to rule in terms of the legislation and point out 
that the CFP requires the precautionary approach rather than the precautionary principle.44  
There is a clear distinction between the approach and the principle. While the precautionary 
principle requires legally-binding decisions err on the side of caution to take account of 
uncertainty as to whether damage will be occasioned and whether the risk to human health 
is acceptable, the precautionary approach to fisheries requires demonstration of certainty 
that damage will be caused before fishing activity will be restricted. As a result, while the 
precautionary principle operates to exclude the risk of damage, the precautionary approach 
incorporates risk of overexploitation and stock depletion which may or may not be 
recoverable.45 Maintaining fish stocks at the margins of biological sustainability is accepted 
practice within regulation and prevents robust programmes for the regeneration and 
rebuilding of stocks. The precautionary approach has never been effective to secure fish 
stock sustainability but instead entrenches a pattern of overexploitation. There has been a 
                                                          
38 Regulation 1380/2013, Article 4(8) 
39 Regulation 1380/2013, Recital 10; Article 191(2) TFEU 
40 Communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle, COM (2000) 1 final, 3  
41 Joined Cases T-74, 76, 83-85, 132, 137, 141/00, Artegodan GmbH and Others v Commission, [2002] ECR II-
4945, paragraph 183 
42 Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited [2010] ECR I-7027, paragraph 61; Case C-333/08 Commission v France 
[2010] ECR I-757, paragraph 93 and case-law cited therein. 
43 Case C-157/96 National Farmers' Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, paragraph 63 
44 Case C-453/08 Karanikolas and Others, [2010] ECR I-7895, paragraph 45 
45 R. Froese and A. Proelß, ‘Rebuilding fish stocks no later than 2015: will Europe meet the deadline?’ Fish and 
Fisheries, 11(2010), 194-202, 199 
steady decline in stocks throughout the course of the CFP. The total catch in 2013 was 
15.8% less than 10 years earlier and 37.1% lower than in 1995.46  
Although the precautionary approach is the standard of both international and EU fishery 
instruments, there has been no attempt to set the parameters of the precautionary 
approach to incorporate sustainability. However, according to a group of eminent marine 
and fisheries scientists and economists, the lack of definition for the approach is readily 
rectified by the adoption of three regulatory rules.  First, fishing mortality should not exceed 
the natural rate of mortality. Second, population sizes should be maintained above half the 
stocks natural abundance. Third, fish should be allowed to grow and reproduce by adjusting 
the size at which fish may be caught.47 This would effect a shift from ‘the current approach 
of maximum acceptable ecological impact to the principal of minimizing of impact’. While it 
is conceded this would force ‘a major conceptual change’ the authors assert it ‘would 
achieve some of the goals of ecosystem-based fisheries management, such as rebuilding 
biomass of prey and predator species and reducing capture of unwanted or threatened 
species and of collateral damage to the ecosystem’.48 By inference, the incorporation of 
these rules in determining fish catch would integrate an ecosystem-based approach into 
fisheries management.  
 
The ecosystem-based approach in EU marine areas 
Concerned at the intensification of commercial activities in marine areas leading to 
deterioration of the environment and creating conflict over use, in the mid-2000s it was 
decided that the fragmentary, sectoral management of marine areas would be replaced by 
an integrated cross-sectoral approach to combat the serious impacts of human activity. This 
would facilitate effective action to tackle ‘climate change, the degradation of the marine 
environment, and the lack of sustainability in resource exploitation.’ 49 Under the new 
Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), the abatement of environmental damage was the 
objective and this was to be achieved though the attainment of ‘good environmental status’ 
for EU waters by 2020.50 Integrated management across sectors was to adopt decision-
making that would be informed by principles of subsidiarity, competitiveness, stakeholder 
participation and it would adopt the ecosystem approach. The objectives of the integrated 
policy were to be rooted in the EU’s agenda for the creation of jobs and economic growth. 
However, the IMP contained little that would address the regulation of fishing, although the 
Commission stated it would ensure the CFP would reflect the ecosystem-based approach. 51   
                                                          
46 Eurostat, ‘Statistics Explained: Fishery Statistics’ Section 1.2: ‘http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Fishery_statistics#Catches 
47 R. Froese, H. Winker, D. Gascuel, U. Rashid Sumaila and D. Pauly, ‘Minimizing the impact fishing’, Fish and 
Fisheries, 17(2016), 785-802 
48 Ibid. 
49 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, 
COM (2007) 575 final, 1 
50 See the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, below. 
51 COM (2007) 575 final, Section 4.1 
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) was adopted in 2008, constituting the 
environmental pillar of the IMP.52 An ecosystem-based approach is to be adopted with 
regard to the management of human activities while at the same time ‘enabling the 
sustainable use of marine goods and services’. Rather than a balancing between the socio-
economic demands on living marine resources and protection of the environment, the 
intention is that ‘priority should be given to achieving or maintaining good environmental 
status in the marine environment, to continuing its protection and preservation, and to 
preventing its subsequent deterioration’.53 While the ecosystem-based approach is intended 
to ensure that the collective pressure of human activities on the environment is kept within 
levels compatible with the achievement of good environmental status by 2020, it is also 
recognised this may not be possible in all marine waters.54 
Environmental protection is a competence shared between the EU and the Member States. 
Achieving good environmental status for waters within the EU area is the duty of the 
Member States. Individually, Member States are each responsible for addressing 
environmental degradation in their waters but are to act jointly with other Member States 
to adopt mutually agreed performance standards to redress damage.55 EU waters have been 
divided into European Marine Regions according to geographical and environmental criteria.  
Within each marine region, each Member State belonging to that region must develop 
strategies for their marine waters, and then act in cooperation with other Member States 
and any non-EU countries with interests in the particular area in the management of the 
area. Member States are to produce development plans which, in conjunction with the 
assessments of other States in the same region, will define ‘good environmental status’ and 
enable clear environmental targets and monitoring programmes to be established.56 
Establishing good environmental status requires that steps are taken to secure fully 
functioning marine ecosystems in all their constituent parts. In that way, marine areas will 
be able to maintain their resilience to human-induced environmental change so that the 
‘human-induced decline of biodiversity is prevented’.57  
Eleven qualitative descriptors are set out in the MSFD ranging across the whole spectrum of 
biological diversity. These signifiers of good environmental status address all environmental 
aspects: the maintenance of species and habitats; the identification of safe levels on 
invasive species; the maintenance of healthy fish stocks; the maintenance of the 
components of the foodweb; the integrity of the seafloor to ensure the functioning of 
ecosystems; and further descriptors concern eutrophication, contaminants, litter and 
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energy. 58 The intention is that through the maintenance of standards established for each 
aspect of the environment, good environmental status as a whole can be achieved. Healthy 
fish stocks will be evidenced in populations of all commercially exploited fish and shellfish 
maintained within safe biological limits with each population exhibiting an age and size 
distribution indicative of a healthy stock.59 To hold fish within safe biological limits, stocks 
must not be overfished.  
In accordance with the MSFD, Member States are required to report to the Commission on 
steps taken to implement the directive. Current information from the European 
Environment Agency shows that progress towards achieving good environmental status has 
been poor. An exception has been for reported fish stocks which have increasingly good 
environmental status with regard to the MSFD criteria of fishing mortality and reproductive 
capacity the further north their location.60 However Member States have failed to reach 
agreement on how the MSFD descriptors for good environmental status should be 
measured and met. Without common standards, no consistent and coherent strategy has 
been established. Reviewing the information submitted to the Commission as required 
under the terms of the Directive, the Commission found that UK measures are only partially 
adequate to achieve good environmental status. Measures adopted by the other major 
fishing countries, Denmark, Spain, France and the Netherlands are based on inadequate 
definitions of good environmental status so that effective targets have not been established. 
With divergent understanding of, and approaches to, good environmental status it followed 
that no conclusions as to the efficacy of approaches by the Commission could be drawn and 
comparisons between Member States’ performances were impossible.61  
 
The Ecosystem-based approach under the Common Fisheries Policy 
Despite the environmental descriptors in the MSFD, fisheries are not subject to its direction 
and the MSFD notes that fisheries will continue to be regulated exclusively through the 
CFP.62 As the Fisheries Regulation stipulates, ‘the CFP shall implement the ecosystem-based 
approach to fisheries management’ to minimise the adverse effects of fishing activities on 
the marine ecosystem and ensure the degradation of the marine environment is avoided. 
The expectation is that marine fishing activity will operate to support the objective of good 
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environmental status for the seas.63 Under the CFP, the ecosystem approach is to be 
adopted in multiannual plans and most important stocks are now managed through such 
plans.64 However, huge complexity is indicated in applying the approach. Account is to be 
taken of ‘fishing and other human activities, while preserving both the biological wealth and 
the biological processes necessary to safeguard the composition, structure and functioning 
of the habitats of the ecosystem affected, by taking into account the knowledge and 
uncertainties regarding biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems’.65 
Unsurprisingly, exactly how this is to be done is not elaborated but there are steps that may 
be taken which may be seen as giving effect to an ecosystem approach.  
To facilitate fisheries policy to incorporate environmental protection in management, the 
Fisheries Regulation provides for the adoption of specific measures to comply with EU 
environmental legislation, some of which are within Union institutional competence and 
others which are available to the Member States. The Union may adopt stock recovery areas 
in areas of biological sensitivity, and the Commission may be empowered to do so under the 
terms of multiannual plans. However, the Commission is reliant on Member State advice for 
the effectiveness of such areas because they are to identify recovery areas that may form 
part of a coherent network.66 Member States may adopt conservation measures to comply 
with EU environmental legislation contained in the MSFD, which provides for spatial 
protection measures that will contribute ‘to coherent and representative networks of 
marine protected areas, adequately covering the diversity of the constituent ecosystem, 
such as special areas of conservation pursuant to the Habitats Directive, special protection 
areas to the Birds Directive, and marine protected areas’ agreed either by the EU or 
Member States in international or regional agreements that will build the Natura 2000 
network.67  The Wild Birds Directives requires Member States establish Special Protection 
Areas and the Habitats Directive requires Member States to provide habitat protection for 
endangered species, flora and fauna special areas of conservation. However, the conflict 
between environmental protection and commercial entitlements to fish under the CFP is 
scarcely mitigated. Measures adopted by a Member State must not interfere with the 
fishing activities of fishing vessels of other Member States and must be compatible with CFP 
objectives.68 The only exception to the prohibition on unilateral Member State action is in 
case of emergency where there is a serious threat to the marine biological resources or 
ecosystem. In such situation, the Member State is required to consult with the Commission 
and Member States who will be affected by the restriction as well as relevant Advisory 
Councils before a measure is adopted. Even then, the Commission may intervene to require 
the Member State to repeal such measures.69  
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While the powers of the Member States are limited, the Commission is empowered to 
adopt restrictive measures for environmental protection that will apply to all vessels.70 
Either at the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, the Commission may adopt 
measures to limit, restrict or stop fishing activity in the event of urgency relating to a serious 
threat to the conservation of marine biological resources or marine ecosystem.71 Such 
threat, whatever its cause, is to be capable of displacing fishing activity for a maximum 
period of six months although this may be renewed for a further six months.72  To be valid, 
the serious threat must be ‘on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency’ which means 
that it must be sufficiently certain as to require immediate action. Any intervention to 
suspend fishing activity on precautionary grounds of scientific uncertainty would be 
unlawful.  
 
Regionalisation and conservation  
If Member States could agree a programme of environmental protection for a marine areas, 
it should be possible to make it effective. Following the 2013 CFP reform, a new mode of 
regionalised management promised to be the most significant reform since the inception of 
the CFP as it applies conservation measures to relevant geographical areas, particularly for 
fish stocks managed under a multiannual plan.73 Regionalisation is organised by sea basin so 
that Member States having a direct interest in a fishery may reach a consensus and submit 
proposals for conservation legislation to the Commission which will adopt the measure by 
Commission Act.74 This merging of Union responsibility for the conservation of stocks under 
the CFP with the responsibility of Member States for environmental protection is intended 
to produce a more coherent and effective system that will be capable of delivering 
sustainability in fish stocks and good environmental status for seas. However, there are 
significant impediments to achieving the anticipated consistency. 
Conservation measures proposed under the CFP must be referred to the relevant Advisory 
Council prior to submission to the Commission for adoption.75 The intention is that decision-
making will, according to the subsidiarity principle, be made closer to participants in the 
industry and will find more support among those to be affected. According to the principles 
of good governance laid down in the Fisheries Regulation, reference to the Advisory 
Councils will ensure appropriate involvement of stakeholders at all stages of decision-
making, from conception to implementation.76 As a result it extends to all conservation 
measures, including emergency measures adopted by the Commission or Member State in 
the event of a serious threat to marine biological resources.77 The allocation of seats in the 
Advisory Councils is 60% to the fishing industry and 40% to all other stakeholders. Thus, the 
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industry dominates the advice that will be provided by the Advisory Councils to the 
Commission on proposed measures.  
The main instrument for conservation under the CFP is the multiannual plan the objective of 
which is to restore and maintain fish stocks above MSY.78 Multiannual plans have been in 
place for some years for most important exploited stocks. These are intended to manage 
fish stocks either by setting fishing mortality levels or setting targets for stock size with the 
intention of fishing at MSY by a deadline. Safeguards are to be imposed for remedial action 
as necessary with review to ensure that MSY is achieved and maintained. The highly 
contested discard ban is to be implemented in accordance with the Fisheries Regulation 
which sets out those stocks that are subject to the landing obligation. In addition, where 
they are able to reach unanimous agreement on species not specified in the Regulation, 
Member States may recommend the institution of landing obligations.79 Further 
conservation measures that may be adopted under the regionalisation provisions are the 
establishment of stock recovery areas and any other measure that is necessary in order to 
comply with EU environmental law. Where Member States wish to adopt conservation 
measures to meet EU environmental law obligations, these must be demonstrated as being 
made on ‘best available scientific advice’, suggesting the evidence would have to be very 
persuasive to displace fishing activity.80  
The first of these new sea basin plans under the reformed CFP has been proposed by the 
Commission for the North Sea to deal with demersal fish stocks, which are those that live 
and feed near the bottom of the sea.81 It is to establish the framework for regionalisation in 
the area. In its explanation of the proposal the Commission deals with competence noting 
that: ‘Provisions of the proposal relate to the conservation of marine biological resources, 
measures that fall under the exclusive competence of the Union. Consequently the 
subsidiarity principle does not apply.’82 Thus, not a conservation measure necessary for 
compliance with obligations under environmental legislation or to respond to a serious 
biological threat. The plan is more accurately described as a plan for sustainable 
exploitation.  
The proposals closely follow the strictures of the Fisheries Regulation. Objectives contained 
in the proposal are for: the restoration and maintenance of harvested species above MSY, a 
contribution to the elimination of discards, and the implementation of the ecosystem-based 
approach to fisheries management. Under the last, the negative impacts of fishing on the 
marine ecosystem are to be minimised. Measures adopted under the plan are to be taken in 
accordance with best available scientific advice.83 They are to be coherent with 
environmental legislation and the objective of achieving good environmental status by 
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2020. Nevertheless, the Commission explains the plan is designed to overcome the effects 
of the discard ban in mixed fisheries which ‘could lead to under-utilisation of quota in the 
North Sea mixed fisheries’ and ‘might have negative economic and social consequences for 
the fishing industry in the coming years’.84  
The issue of under-utilisation of quota concerns the objections to the discard ban. Once fully 
implemented, the Fisheries Regulation makes the discard of any catches in excess of quota 
illegal. This means that in mixed fisheries vessels will have to stop fishing once the quota for 
any one stock is reached so preventing the vessel fishing for other quota. The purpose of the 
plan is to reduce the risk of underfishing, while implementing the MSY catch standard and 
establishing biomass limits to implement the precautionary approach. However, to avoid 
under-utilisation the plan incorporates over-utilisation which is to be redressed through 
biomass safeguard measures that are ‘to give a framework restore stocks when they fall 
below safe biological limits’.85 Once a stock is outside safe biological limits, it is at risk of 
collapse and impaired recruitment. The plan incorporates this risk as acceptable.86 
It seems extraordinary that a measure can be described as being consistent with the 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management while at the same time acknowledging that 
regulation under the plan will lead to fishing beyond sustainable limits so risking stock 
sustainability. Despite reforms and the attempt to shift the basis of fishing to conservation, 
this plan serves up the same menu of fishing at the margin of sustainability incorporating 
risk of biological damage and collapse which has been a feature of the precautionary 
approach in fisheries management under the CFP. To judge from the proposed North Sea 
multiannual plan, the ecosystem approach is yet to be incorporated into fisheries regulation 
despite assertions that it is. Regulation to facilitate not only the exploitation but also the 
overexploitation of a resource that is renewable only if given the time and space to 
regenerate is set to continue. Moreover, its effects will expand as new areas and species 
become accessible as a result of climate change and the deployment of increasingly 
sophisticated new capture technologies by the industry.  
 
Conservation measures necessary to comply with environmental legislation 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation defines deep-sea fisheries as those conducted 
between the depths of 200 and 2000 metres. In 2002, a measure to regulate deep sea 
stocks was adopted by the Council.87 These stocks were described as vulnerable, requiring 
regulation to limit or reduce fishing opportunity. Data was to be collected, access to stocks 
controlled by the issue of special fishing permits and additional control measures were to be 
introduced. Ten years later it was acknowledged that a segment of the EU fishing fleet was 
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dependent on these deep sea species.88 It was noted that ‘deep-sea habitats and 
ecosystems are largely unknown, but we know that they are home to coral reefs as much as 
8,500 years old and ancient species that are still little explored. This is a fragile environment 
that, once damaged, is unlikely to recover. Highly vulnerable to fishing, deep-sea fish stocks 
are quick to collapse and slow to recover because they reproduce at low rates’.89  
The grenadier species, referred to above, is a deep-sea species. Catches for all deep-sea 
species have been declining for years due to overfishing. Therefore, the Commission 
proposed new measures to restrict the use of certain fishing gear in the deep-sea, in 
particular bottom trawls and bottom-set gillnets, and to improve knowledge to aid 
regulation. For this, the Commission proposed measures requiring the collection of data. To 
incentivise cooperation from the industry it was suggested that financial support might be 
made available from EU funds. In contravention of the UN requirement to ban bottom-
trawling in deep-sea areas,90 the EU Economic and Social Committee opined that such ban 
would be disproportionate,91 a position endorsed by the European Parliament which 
deleted the proposed ban on bottom-trawls targeting deep-sea species.92 
Subsequently, at the end of 2016 a new regulation for deep-sea stocks was adopted.93 It 
applies to deep-sea species which are those ‘characterised by a combination of the 
following biological factors: maturation at relatively old ages, slow growth, long life 
expectancies, low natural mortality rates, intermittent recruitment of successful year classes 
and spawning that may not occur every year’.94 Its reach is within EU waters in the North-
                                                          
88 European Commission, Fisheries: the Commission tables new measures for better protection for deep-sea 
stocks and their habitats, Memo/12/586 
89 Ibid. 
90 General Assembly Resolution 61/105, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
and related instruments, A/RES/61/105 (8 December 2006), available from undocs.org/A/RES/61/105; General 
Assembly Resolution 64/72, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 
and related instruments, A/RES/64/72 (4 December 2009), available from undocs.org/A/RES/64/72; A. Rogers 
and M. Gianni, The Implementation of UNGA Resolutions 61/105 and 67/72 in the Management of Deep-Sea 
Fisheries on the High Seas, Report prepared for the Deep-Sea Conservation Coalition, International Programme 
on the State of the Ocean, (London, United Kingdom, 2010) 
91 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing specific conditions to fishing for deep-sea stocks in the North-East 
Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the North-East Atlantic and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 2347/2002’, COM(2012) 371 final — 2012/0179 (COD), paragraph 4.3-4.4; FAO International 
Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas, Rome, FAO. 2009.  
92 European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 December 2013 on the ‘Proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing specific conditions to fishing for deep-sea stocks in the 
North-East Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the North-East Atlantic and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002’, COM(2012) 371 final — 2012/0179 (COD), Amendment 7 
93 Regulation (EU) 2016/2336 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 establishing 
specific conditions for fishing for deep-sea stocks in the north-east Atlantic and provisions for fishing in 
international waters of the north-east Atlantic and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002, OJ 
L354/2016 
94 Regulation (EU) 2016/2336, Article 3(1) 
East Atlantic and over EU fishing vessels fishing in international waters regulated by the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission and certain areas regulated by the Fishery 
Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic.95 Restrictions on access are supported by 
technical restrictions on fishing gear with bottom trawls banned only in depths below 800 
metres but otherwise permitted, while fishing with bottom-set gillnets is authorised. 
The question then arises as to whether it is possible for Member States seeking to adopt 
measures to comply with environmental protection obligations to act pursuant to the terms 
of the Fisheries Regulation.96 The legislation is far from clear and the conflict between the 
CFP and EU environmental protection legislation is to be considered by the Court of Justice 
in a preliminary action brought by Deutscher Naturschutzring, a German umbrella 
organisation for environmental protection, against the Federal Republic of Germany.97 
Questions to the Court concern the proper understanding of Article 11 of the Fisheries 
Regulation, whereby Member States may adopt environmental protection measures within 
waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction provided these do not interfere with fishing 
vessels of other Member States.98 The Court is asked whether a Member State may adopt 
conservation measures to protect the integrity of the seabed in Natura 2000 marine sites by 
prohibiting the use of fishing equipment and gillnets that touch the seabed, where such 
prohibition will impact on the fishing activities of vessels of other Member States. 
Clarification is particularly requested as to: whether the fishing techniques under 
consideration fall within the concept of ‘conservation measures’; the meaning of ‘vessels of 
other Member States’, and whether this phrase includes the fishing vessels of another 
Member State which sail under the German flag; whether adopting conservation measures 
to promote the objectives listed in the Nature Directives falls within the ambit of the Article 
11 provision to ‘meet the objectives of the relevant Union legislation’. The Court is also 
asked to clarify whether Article 11 operates to preclude a Member State from adopting 
measures to comply with the EU’s Environmental Liability Directive.99 If the Court were to 
give negative answers to these questions, the Court is asked whether the exclusive 
competence conferred on the EU by operation of the TFEU for the conservation of marine 
biological resources under the CFP precludes the adoption of the measures to prohibit the 
use of the fishing equipment specified.  
The questions raised illustrate the obstacle to environmental protection posed by the 
provisions of the CFP. Despite the case not having been considered, what is certain is the 
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Court will not permit any encroachment into the exclusive Union competence for the 
conservation of fish stocks. Unilateral attempts by Member States to implement measures 
on environmental protection grounds that will have the effect of restricting fishing activity 
will be permissible only under the terms set by the CFP which demand reference to the 
Commission. Unless all Member States having fishing rather than environmental interests in 
the area are in agreement over the introduction of environmental measures, the 
Commission is empowered to act only if the proposed measures to comply with the Nature 
Directives is urgent and conservation is ‘in jeopardy’.100 In such situation, the protective 
measures may be adopted for twelve months and, where the jeopardising situation persists, 
may continue for a further twelve months, but both periods are stipulated to be maximums. 
Thus, in extremis, restrictions on fishing to protect areas significant under the terms of the 
Nature Directives may be permissible, but the default position of the CFP is to permit fishing 
activity and ecosystem exploitation. If the Court does give priority to fishing activity it will 
render almost nugatory the powers of the Member States to implement ecosystem 
protections where the operation of the CFP may be affected. 
The exploitation of species, such as the grenadier, underscores fundamental problems in 
fisheries regulation. In its design it is neither directed at, nor capable of, protecting the 
marine environment or responding to the particular problem in the fishing industry’s 
practice of fishing down the marine food web.101 Spain, in contesting a measure to fix fishing 
opportunities for deep-sea fish stocks, was either unconcerned about resource and 
ecosystem sustainability or was in thrall to its fishing industry.102 Deep-sea stocks only 
began to be regulated by the EU in 2003,103 but in doing so the EU sanctioned the 
exploitation of extremely vulnerable slow-growing, long lived species.104 If unregulated, the 
Commission explained, targeting deep-sea stocks will lead to ‘a race by fishing undertakings 
to take possession of a free resource, without having sufficient regard to the sustainable 
level of exploitation’.105 Although regulation is deemed ‘a necessary public intervention’ 
intending the reduction of ‘the impact of fishing activity on the ecosystem and the food web 
as a consequence of sudden reductions in the size of certain fish populations’, EU regulation 
of other stocks has not led to sustainability. Regulation has avoided the essential problem 
that, beyond paying a licence fee, the resource is free to appropriators who bear no 
responsibility either for its regeneration or its maintenance.  
 
Progress towards sustainability? 
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In order to draft proposals, decisions and policy measures the Commission must be 
furnished with scientific advice based on the principles of excellence, independence and 
impartiality, and transparency,106 applying best practice principles of risk assessment.  
Scientific committees have been established to advise on matters particular to the various 
sectors, including the Scientific Committee of the European Environment Agency (SCEEA) 
which advises on any matter within the competence of the Agency,107  and the Scientific, 
Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF).108 The scientific committees are 
tasked according to legislative provision.  In the approximation of laws for the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market, legislative proposals concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, must provide a high level of protection 
and must take account of any new development based on scientific facts.109 In order to be 
able to advise the policy-maker, the scientific committees must make an assessment on how 
the issue at hand affects human or environmental welfare or the impacts it may have in the 
future.   
In preparing its policy on the environment, the EU must take account of available scientific 
and technical data, as well as the particular environmental conditions in the various regions 
of the Union.  Specifically, the way in which the data is used must weigh the potential 
benefits and costs of action or lack of action, together with the economic and social 
development of the Union as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.110 As to 
fisheries policy, the terms of the Fisheries Regulation are peppered with references to 
scientific advice, a category covering both social and biological sciences. In the recitals and 
legally-binding provisions, scientific advice is intended to elucidate problems, such as the 
phenomenon of ‘choke species’. Advice is to be provided to ensure good governance, 
dictate the introduction of the landing obligation, permit the increase in fish catch, inform 
the EU’s negotiating position internationally.111 If such advice is to be available, reliable and 
accurate data must be collected and this is a major objective of the CFP.112 Part V of the 
Regulation entitled ‘Scientific Base for Fisheries Management’ sets out administrative 
requirements regarding data collection, requiring Member States to coordinate their 
fisheries and aquaculture research and reiterates wide consultation with both science and 
social science bodies.113 
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So important is the role of scientific advice that, as a matter of good governance, fisheries 
measures must be adopted ‘in accordance with the best available scientific advice’.114 
However, there is no specific requirement for scientific advice to be used in order to 
determine any particular aspect of fisheries policy, although there are technical 
management issues, such as the determination of ‘maximum sustainable yield’ that seem to 
demand such expertise. In practice, biological scientific advice, which ought to be 
determinative of policy, is not necessarily the basis of the measure because the objectives of 
fisheries policy are socio-economic as much as environmental. Accordingly, scientific 
evidence is to taken into account along with technical and economic advice in devising 
conservation and exploitation measures.115 Given the intention of the Fisheries Regulation 
to promote sustainable use, it make sense that biological scientific advice would be the 
basis of decision-making. Instead, scientific bodies are to be consulted, and even the STECF 
is to be consulted only where appropriate, and such consultation is not to be unfocused, 
regard being had to ‘the proper management of public funds’.116 Without an effective 
mechanism to deliver sustainable use, a sustainable marine ecosystem seems unlikely.  
Under the CFP, there is no obligation for good environmental status and this omission 
affects the replenishment of fish stocks for future use. A report of experts in a study set up 
by the EU’s Scientific Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) looked at the 
long term trend in landings.117 Yield has declined by more than 50% in recent years as 
compared with the 1970s in the North Sea, ‘which is by far the most important fishing area 
in Europe’, with similar patterns in the Irish Sea, Celtic Sea, Bay of Biscay and Iberian coast. 
While yields from seas to the west of Scotland and Ireland held up during most of the 
period, since 2006 yields have halved. Only the Baltic Sea had resisted such declines, but 
even here landings were lower. Stock abundance based on spawning biomass had increased 
over much of the period but had declined in recent years while recruitment to stocks 
‘exhibited a consistently decreasing trend’. The report found that during the past ten years 
there has been a reduction in fishing pressure and the mean fishing mortality rate of 
assessed stocks has almost halved in all the ecosystems subject to study but there was no 
clear recovery in the biomass and ecosystems. Regeneration of stocks was not being 
achieved which has implications for the effectiveness and social acceptance of fisheries 
management. The authors conclude that it will be difficult to reach the intended EU MSY 
target which would mean that the good environmental status sought by the MSFD would 
also fail to be achieved.118 This failure affects the perception of abundance. The low level to 
which stocks have fallen creates a new benchmark for determining stocks’ natural 
abundance from which improvement is measured. Similarly, the state of ecosystems is 
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measured from a degraded status and, with the passing of generations of biologists, the 
memory of more robust and diverse ecosystems is lost.119  
 
Future Prospects 
Emerging out of the European Union’s IMP, the EU developed its Blue Growth agenda, 
described by the Commission as intending the harnessing of ‘the untapped potential of 
Europe’s oceans, seas and coasts for jobs and growth’.120 The EU’s Blue Growth project is 
conceived as offering ‘new and innovative ways to help steer the EU out of its current 
economic crisis’,121 the Commission ‘showing how Europe's coasts, seas and oceans have 
the potential to be a major source’ of prosperity.122 Although the Commission seeks to 
increase coordination between marine sectors, the focus of this agenda is on sustainable 
growth across marine and maritime sectors as a whole. Growth areas include aquaculture 
which is seen as having the potential to create jobs and wealth,123 but the most basic of 
marine activities, marine fishing, has been excluded.  
Instead of seeking to confront the system failure of the CFP, the EU is concentrating its 
effort in gaining access to new fishing grounds. The EU made its first official pronouncement 
with regard to the Arctic region in 2008. An advisory paper had been issued by the 
Commission to the European Parliament and Council in response to the emerging concern 
over climate change. Climate change was characterised as ‘a "threats multiplier” [so that] 
environmental changes are altering the geo-strategic dynamics of the Arctic with potential 
consequences for international stability and European security interests’ necessitating the 
development of an EU Arctic policy.124  Three main policy objectives were put forward 
including the protection and preservation of the Arctic in cooperation with its population 
and the promotion of the sustainable use of resources. Resource development and 
exploitation included hydrocarbon, commercial navigation, tourism and fisheries. Fisheries 
were anticipated to expand as a result of climate change and the EU was concerned to 
establish a regulatory framework ‘before new fishing opportunities arise’. 
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The EU’s Arctic Policy is intended to complement the Arctic policies of the Member States 
and follows closely the Danish policy, which observes that temperature increases in the 
Arctic and ice melt ‘can make new areas of the Arctic potentially attractive for fishing’.125 
Denmark proposes a consolidation of the fleet with investment in new, larger fishing vessels 
leading to a restructuring that will ‘cause an outflow of labour to other industries and make 
demands on social policy’.126 Despite asserting a sustainable policy that will protect 
indigenous populations, the fishing policy makes no provision to protect the artisanal sector 
and fails to indicate positive measures to ensure the sustainability of traditional fisheries-
dependent communities. For its part, the EU lays claim to a role in the determination of the 
future of the Arctic area, insisting that the legal framework for new regional fisheries 
management organisation in international Arctic waters must be established in ‘an open 
and inclusive manner’, and it ‘welcomes the broadening of the negotiations to involve major 
fishing nations’.127 Given the decline of fish abundance in the North East Atlantic since the 
middle of the last century, it is difficult to be optimistic that either this will be reversed or 
that new, northerly fishing grounds will not follow the same pattern. 
The stream of EU initiatives related to the protection of the marine environment is 
continually undermined by the absolute determination of all economic actors to exploit a 
free resource. The ideals of the Blue Growth Agenda, at least in relation to marine fisheries, 
will similarly be trampled by the drive to open new fishing grounds or to further exploit 
those already fished to exhaustion. If a system giving greater weight to the sustainability of 
the ecosystem is to be achieved, operators, regulators and governments will have to 
understand and accept its goals. Regulation alone cannot provide a full solution to the 
market failure that gives rise to excess capacity and overfishing. Persuading operators of 
their responsibilities in their use of the common resource would be simplified if they were 
charged for the fish resource from which their profits derive. The user-pays principle is a 
general principle of EU law applied to other natural resource sectors and there is nothing to 
prevent its application to the marine fisheries sector. A system could be devised which 
captures the additional profit that arises from the existence of a free resource and which 
currently provides such a powerful driver to the expansion of fleet capacity. Introducing 
such a system would result in an outcome that was both economically and biologically 
stable, allowing the resource to recover and the industry to prosper.  
Conclusion 
Only lip-service is being paid by the EU to rebuilding the abundance of the fish resource so 
that fishing can become economically sustainable for the long-term. This is short-sighted 
and is contrary to the EU’s sustainable development objectives. The failure to restore stocks 
to their former abundance is a denial of intergeneration equity. Expansion into new marine 
areas, either the deep ocean or fisheries beyond EU waters, not only jeopardises 
sustainability in those areas but also promotes an inequitable use impacting other states 
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and peoples. Maintaining a discrete fisheries policy that prioritises economic activity 
undermines the EU’s commitment to sustainable development and seriously impedes the 
achievement of good environmental status for the EU’s marine areas. The minimum 
international standard of sustainability through MSY according to the precautionary 
approach has proved to be inadequate, and the CFP requires no more than coherence with 
environmental legislation and is not subject to it. 
As a regional organisation with a highly developed legal and regulatory system, the EU is in a 
position to set its own more rigorous and environmentally sustainable model for fisheries. 
Until the Treaty is amended to include an objective of environmental protection under the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Title, there will be no obligation on decision-makers to prioritise 
ecosystem protection over economic activity. It is open to the Court of Justice to review its 
interpretation of the precautionary approach to fishing activity within EU waters. As the 
precautionary approach is derived from the precautionary principle, the Court of Justice 
should apply the principle so that fisheries are managed within the bounds of biological 
sustainability rather than being regulated on the margin of unsustainability and collapse. 
Changes to the Treaty or an amended judicial approach could undoubtedly improve the 
state of EU fisheries, although at the cost of an ever-larger and more unwieldy regulatory 
burden. A permanent sustainable solution requires a fundamental change in approach.128 
Only when the user pays for the fish resource itself will a truly environmental and 
economically stable outcome be achieved. Such an outcome is no more than EU citizens 
deserve. Protecting biodiversity protects human welfare, now and into the future.  
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